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Nationally and in South Carolina, prime agricultural and forest land has been undergoing rapid
conversion to other uses, primarily residential and to a lesser extent commercial. This conversion
has important implications for economic development, community amenities, environmental protection, survival of agriculture, and other public policy questions. The focus of this paper is on the
impact of such conversion on local government finances, as well as a preliminary inventory of the
fiscal tools that governments can and do use to minimize any negative impact.
The total amount of prime land converted and the speed of conversion is heavily impacted by alternative patterns of land development. The same amount of population growth can be accommodated
with very different patterns. One pattern has been described as ÒranchetteÓÑlarge lots with scattered housing. Another pattern is dense development that may or may not be surrounded by open
space. A third is a random distribution with patchwork developments on moderate sized lots separated by undeveloped land. A fourth pattern is infill development, making use of scattered lots
within the developed urban and suburban areas. These alternative land use patterns have very different implications not only for the loss of prime lands to other uses but also for local government
service costs.
Economic versus fiscal impact
Projects involving the development of agricultural, forest, or ÒidleÓ land are often promoted in the
name of economic development. That is, proponents argue that the project will generate jobs and
income that will enhance the economic well-being of area residents. The additional jobs and income
are referred to as economic impact. Economic impact studies measure the impact of development on
the private sectorÑnew businesses, retail sales, housing construction, employment opportunities,
and increases in personal income. For the last fifty years, economic development has been a primary
goal of the state and local public sector in South Carolina. In many areas of the state, where job
opportunities are limited, there is still great demand to attract employers of any kind. Citizens may
be willing to accept a negative fiscal impact in exchange for the opportunities provided by new
employers ranging from a new prison in Allendale County to a retirement community in McCormick
or a chip mill in Laurens.
In other areas, howeverÑalong the coast and the I-85 corridor in particularÑthe promised positive
impact of continued new development is increasingly being questioned on several grounds. While
environmentalists and farm interests have joined forces to argue the benefits of farmland preservation, there are also many other voices challenging

existing development patterns on pragmatic grounds of costs and benefits to the local communities
themselves. These arguments involve the costs of congestion, increasing demands on infrastructure
for expansion, replacement and maintenance, changing real estate values for established areas, and
fiscal impact on local governments.
Increasing congestion and pressures on physical and social infrastructure may negatively impact the
quality of life for both established and new residents. Rapid population growth may slow police and
fire response time, exhaust the capacity of the landfill too rapidly and require expensive and more
remote landfill space, crowd the schools and force new construction, or require significant outlay for
new roads as well as water and sewer lines and treatment capacity.
In counties where unemployment rates are low and have been for several years, there is often a
concern that the added jobs will just result in in-migration because the local labor market is already
tight. In-migration may further speed up population growth to a faster pace and level than the area is
willing or able to accommodate at the same level of public services. If the jobs are entry-level, they
are likely to attract families with young children living in relatively modest housing (often mobile
homes in South Carolina), resulting in pressures on the schools without a comparable rise in tax
revenues. In some of those areas economic developers are more selective, concentrating their efforts
on attracting firms that offer better jobs at higher wages.
Economic development can affect amenities beyond congestion and pressures on the infrastructure.
The disappearance of green space and the alteration of the landscape from rural to urban has not only
a visual impact (and in some cases a thermal one, raising the average summer temperature) but also
has a direct measurable impact on land and real estate values. Loss of open space also disturbs
wildlife habitats and limits biodiversity, which is an amenity that is difficult to quantify but important to many urban and suburban residents.
One of the costs that are not counted in a market-driven land use development pattern is the impact
of new development on both private and public physical capital in older developed areas. When land
is cheap outside the developed core, it is easier and less expensive to start fresh than to maintain or
rehabilitate older buildings and facilities. As these privately-owned assets deteriorate, there is a loss
of both economic activity (income and jobs) in the core and tax revenues to the local government.
Despite the loss of population in urban areas, local governments must still maintain infrastructure
and provide services to a declining population supported by a deteriorating property tax base.
Finally, there is considerable research evidence indicating the long-term negative effect of most
kinds of development (but especially housing) on local government. Both operating costs and
infrastructure construction and maintenance expenditures are impacted, more so in the case of lowdensity residential developments that are not closely contiguous to developed urban areas (sprawl).
Rarely do such developments generate enough local revenue to cover the additional costs, but the
discrepancy varies greatly with the type of development.

Markets, incentives, and nonoptimal choices
Existing and emerging land use patterns are the result of individual choices, influenced heavily by
both market forces and constraints imposed and incentives offered by governments at all levels. Left
to the individual buyer and seller, the ownership and use of land would be determined by the highest
present value in terms of projected future revenues and costs, discounted at prevailing private market
rates of interest. In some instances, leaving land ÒidleÓ while awaiting a future more attractive use
may be the most attractive alternative, an outcome familiar to those who are aware of the workings
of any futures markets. The actual pattern of land use may be less than the socially desirable optimal
pattern of land use for several reasons. Among the major sources of distortions in land use choice
are imperfect information, overdiscounting future costs and benefits where benefits are immediate
and costs are delayed, spillover effects (externalities), and public policies that create perverse incentives.
Imperfect information on the part of developers, new residents, established residents, and/or local
officials can lead to a misallocation of the actual cost of development among the relevant parties. All
investments contain elements of uncertainty, and even if relevant information exists, the parties
involved may not be able to willing to make the necessary effort to access and process that information. Most people, but particularly those for whom these decisions are not as central (existing
residents, for example) live in a world of bounded rationality or rational ignorance because of the
high time cost of obtaining perfect information. The nation is littered with abandoned strip malls
that suggest developers operated on less than perfect information even on their own future revenues
and costs, let alone costs that they may be indifferent to because they are able to impose those costs
(see below). New residents may be unaware of the future public sector costs that their arrival will
create, resulting in higher local tax burdens on themselves as well as on established residents.
Established residents and local public officials are persuaded that growth will reduce their tax burdens through sharing the cost of public services among more citizens, an expectation that is rarely
fulfilled in practice. Residential development in particular tends to add more to the cost than the
revenue side of local government budgets. Loudon County Virginia, just outside Washington D.C.,
offers one good example:
ÒIn Loudon County, Virginia, officials in 1994 estimated that a new
home must sell for at least $400,000 to bring in sufficient property taxes
to cover the cost of all the services the county provides. By contrast, the
average home sold that year for less than $200,000. The fastest selling
properties in 1995 were town homes averaging between $120,000 and
$160,000.Ó1
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This estimate confirmed an earlier study in Culpepper County, Virginia, which found that residential
development cost $1.25 in county services for every $1 of revenue, while service costs were only 19
cents per dollar of revenue generated for industrial, commercial, or agricultural land.1 Likewise,
Benfield cites an earlier study by the American Farmland Trust that found a revenue to cost ratio for
residential property is 1:1.11, while the rations are 1:0.29 for commercial and industrial property and
1:0.31 for farmland, forests and open space.2 However, as Benfield notes, these ratios may overstate the benefits of nonresidential development:
ÒA 1991 study by the DuPage County, Illinois Development Department
found that, between 1986 and 1989, areas of the county with significant
nonresidential development experienced a greater increase in taxes than did
areas without nonresidential developmentÉcommercial development may
create a demand for additional nearby residential development
whichÉbrings a fiscal drain that offsets the benefits.Ó3
Discounting the future. Developers, tenants in new malls, industrial firms, home buyers, and
renters are all private, self-interested individuals. They are not expected, required, or even encouraged to consider the long-term community impact of their choices, unless they expect that future
taxes and service levels will directly impact on the market value of their investment before it is
substantially depreciated, i.e., that those community impacts will be capitalized into the present
value of their property. Until recently, the average American household moved every seven years,
which in many cases leads to a very short-term perspective about the local community.
Homeowners may invest in their own homes in order to preserve the value of a private asset, but
may be less concerned about investing in the long-term future of a community where they do not
plan to remain. This attitude toward community investment is particularly likely to prevail if they
believe that the benefits of low taxes will enhance property values and the costs of deferred capital
investment and maintenance will not surface in time to affect the value of their property. Many of
the costs of development appear only gradually over time as service costs rise, property values
decline or at least fail to keep pace with service costs, infrastructure must be replaced, etc.
An essential role of government is to offer incentives (both positive and negative) to offset these
higher private rates of discounting the future (compared with a social rate of discount that takes into
account future generations and future residents). However, government officials themselves face
perverse incentives to engage in short-run behavior
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that has long-term detrimental effects. Elections are frequent, taxes and regulations are unpopular,
maintenance can be deferred. Economic development strategies have often run counter to the
governmentÕs responsibility to consider intergenerational issues. These strategies often maximize
the short-term, up-front incentives offered to firms in order to locate in a particular area for reasons
of employment and income. In the short-term even local governments may engage in short-run
maximizing behavior at the expense of longer term negative consequences. Trott notes this kind of
behavior in the case of California:
ÒSince Proposition 13, one of the few ways remaining to local governments to raise local revenue is by cashing in on farmland. Studies
showing that in the long run this kind of development doesnÕt pay for
itself notwithstanding, local governments in California largely persist at
what has become popularly known as Ôzoning for dollarsÕ to survive
financially from one budget to the next...To be successful at stemming
the loss of farmlandÉwe need different ways to finance local government where there is no nexus between local revenue and land development.Ó1
Spillover effects or externalities, positive and negative, between adjacent landowners or between
neighborhoods or larger groupings are another important source of decisions that are appropriate
from an individual perspective but not from the larger perspective that considers all the impacted
parties. Spillover effects are particularly significant in the matter of the cost of providing public
services privately owned developments. Broadly speaking, the private cost of development varies
little from one site to another within a given area. However, the cost of providing public services to
different kinds of development in terms of both location and density varies enormously from one site
to another. Because private developers are not required to take these external costs into account, the
pattern of development may diverge substantially from the pattern that is most efficient and costeffective in terms of providing public services.
A second set of spillover effects comes from the interaction between incompatible uses when commercial, industrial, and urban or suburban residential development invades space that was previously
agricultural. Nelson notes a variety of spillover effects from urbanization as it encroaches on agricultural areas. There is increasing regulation of farm farm activities that affect nonfarm residents (e.g.,
use of fertilizer, disposal of manure, smells, more restrictions on use of farm chemicals, irrigation
and runoff); higher property taxes on farmland to pay for urban services; air pollution damage to
crops by cars and industry; increasing destruction/theft/vandalism; and greater use of eminent domain to acquire farm land to service residential developments. All of these effects make agricultural
land close to urban areas less attractive to use for farm and forest purposes. Agricultural land also
offers benefits to urban areas that are unpriced and therefore undervalued, including groundwater
recharge and water purification, flood and erosion control, air cleansing, and scenery. These factors
tend to drive down the market price of
1

Trott, Kenneth E., 1998: Impact of the California Land Conservation (Williamson) Act, in The Performance of State Programs for
Farmland Retention, Proceedings of a National Research Conference, Columbus, OH, p. 200-204.

agricultural land and make it more attractive to developers. As the future of agricultural use of land
becomes more uncertain, farmers may be more reluctant to invest in the land, improvements, and
equipment, further depressing its value as agricultural land relative to other uses.1 As Grossi observed in the case of New YorkÕs farmland preservation policies,
ÒÉthe economics of the marketplace were simply too powerfulÉland
protection programs would not be successful without consideration of the
disparity between the landÕs value for farming and its fair market value for
houses.Ó2
Government incentives. Government is not always the solution: sometimes it is the problem.
There are a variety of perverse government incentives at all levels that have the effect of overstimulating some kinds of land use and understimulating or even discouraging others. The Federal (and
often state) deduction for property taxes and mortgage interest for homeowners has encouraged
investment in housingÑmore housing, less dense housing, more expensive housing than would have
otherwise occurred. State homestead exemptions from the property tax have the same effect.
Nelson summarizes some of the policy actions by government that have exacerbated the problems
associated with conversion of prime lands to other uses:
ÒOne of the problems with prime farmland preservation is that such land is
sometimes made more valuable in the market for urban uses through subsidies such as (1)inefficient inducements to industrial development through tax
concessions and subsidized utility extensions; (2)inefficient home construction caused partly by tax concessions given to homeowners through the
federal income tax system; (3) inefficient urban land allocation caused by
local government planning policies oversupplying land for lower densities
while undersupplying land for higher densities thereby forcing more lower
[density] residential development than is efficient; and (4)inefficient public
facility pricing resulting in higher density development in urban areasÑ
where facility costs are relatively low per unitÑpaying the same rates and
thereby subsidizing suburban lower density developmentÑwhere facility
costs are relatively high per unitÉÓ3
Grossi, likewise, notes that a significant part of the problem in managing land use in and around
urban areas is the result of both government inaction and inappropriate government policies:
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ÒThere is no Òfree market.Ó All markets are shaped by government policy,
inherent in which are regulations and subsidies that favor one behavior
over another, and affect value in the marketplaceÉthere would be a lot
less pressure on this nationÕs farmland if we could somehow quite subsidizing sprawl and start subsidizing urban quality of life. It would also
make conservation a whole lot cheaper.Ó1
Measuring fiscal impact
This paper is not concerned with the broader economic or social impacts of land conversion, important as these questions are. Our focus is on a much narrower question, changes in the revenues and
expenditures of cities, counties and school districts. These changes are referred to as fiscal impact.
The initial reaction might logically be that a positive economic impact that results in more jobs,
houses, sales and income would generate more revenue for state and local government. While this
outcome is generally true, more revenue does not always translate into a net gain for state or local
governments and the residents/taxpayers already there. In some cases development adds more to
local government revenues than it does to local expenditure demands or costs, which is defined as a
positive fiscal impact. Unless the revenue structure is designed to capture revenue from the new
stream of private incomes that flow from economic development, and unless some of the costs of
new development are shifted back to the developers or buyers, state and/or local governments may
find that a stronger private sector is quite compatible with an increasingly fiscally stressed public
sector. The case studies summarized in a later section show predominantly negative fiscal impact
from most kinds of development of agricultural, forest, or idle land for industrial, commercial and
residential uses.
In fact, greenspace itself contributed to property values and thereby indirectly to property tax revenues. According to one study,
ÒÉdistance from the greenbelt has a statistically significant negative impact
on the price of residential property. Specifically, other things being equal,
there is a $4.20 decrease in the price of a residential property for every foot
one moves away from the greenbelt.Ó2
Contributing factors to negative fiscal impact. Development can have a positive economic
impact on the economy and on the developer and yet have a negative fiscal impact. One of the
primary reasons is that the relevant factors that enter into locational preferences are different for
developers and for local officials. Developers encounter somewhat similar building costs anywhere
in a given region. They make their
1
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locational decisions based on the price and availability of vacant land and its potential attractiveness
to buyers based on such factors as highway access. A large part of the costs created by such development do not fall directly on either the developer or the buyer, but on the local government. No
one pays much heed to costs that they create that are imposed on others unless those other parties
can find ways to internalize those costs, i.e., to make sure that those who create the costs are made to
bear them. The costs of development, which may be virtually identical from one site to another in a
given area from the developerÕs standpoint, are likely to be very different in the eyes of local government depending on the location, the density, and the kinds of improvements (residential, commercial, industrial) that are being built. In Robert FrankÕs summary of the literature in 1989, he notes
that
ÒÉcosts typically borne by the municipality fluctuated much more dramatically with location (and available capacity) than did on-site frontage costs,
typically financed privately in the purchase of a house, making the
municipalityÕs stake in infill development greater than that of the builder.Ó 1
Second, the local revenue structure is not designed to fully recover the additional costs of development. The property tax system and other local revenue sources do not penalize low density development or reward high density development. There are no rewards for locating in areas of excess
capacity for water treatment, sewerage treatment, or public schools. There are no penalties for
locating far out and increasing the traffic congestion, parking problems and air pollution by increasing traffic congestion. Local governments, especially in South Carolina, are constrained in their use
of one of the potentially most useful tools, impact fees, to attempt to direct development in appropriate channels. The availability of incentives to industrial and commercial location by fee in lieu of
taxes (FILOT) agreements and other forms of property tax relief further aggravates the attempts by
local governments to obtain revenue from the industrial and commercial tax base in order to support
services for residential property owners.
Another tool that might be useful in directing development into the least costly channels is regulation, but there is strong resistance to using zoning, land use planning, and other techniques to channel development as an infringement on property rights. There is a strong constituency for a somewhat absolute concept of property rights, as evidenced by takings legislation proposed in South
Carolina and elsewhere (the Lucas case on the South Carolina coast being one of the better known
instances). Fear of litigation makes land use planners somewhat cautious. These regulatory tools of
growth management have been employed to a limited degree in most states, but are relatively new
and lightly utilized in South Carolina. In some states, cities have extra-territorial zoning, or (in
North Carolina), can easily annex contiguous areas that are becoming urbanized and bring them
within the taxing and zoning powers of the city. In Tennessee, county land use plans included
designation of urban growth areas around cities. Only in those areas can cities provide services and
annex additional land. In the West, cities and counties
1

Frank, James E. 1989. The costs of alternative development patterns: a review of the literature, Washington, D.C.: Urban Land
Institute, p. 18.

frequently control development by limiting access to water rights, an option that works well in the
dry mountain states, most of which have a separation of water rights from property ownership that is
largely unfamiliar in the East.
Yet another factor in the development-local government equation is fragmentation of governments.
Cities and their counties rarely consult, adjacent counties even less so. Development tends to be
viewed as a series of isolated events defined by city or county boundaries, rather than in regional
terms where more efficient use of facilities (roads, schools, water and sewer systems) might help to
control the costs of development. And fragmentation often allows developers to play one local
government against another for favorable tax treatment or additional services, further aggravating
the negative impact of development on local governments.
Fragmentation also extends to the separation between state and local governments. Often the fiscal
impact of development (non-residential, at least) is positive for the state, which receives additional
income and sales tax revenues but provides relatively little additional services. There may be some
redistribution of state aid to growing areas using the formulas for distribution of state aid to school
districts (tied partly to school population) and cities and counties (total population). In the case of
school districts, the additional aid to accommodate more pupils may be more than offset by reduced
aid because of the increase in the property tax base from commercial and/or industrial development,
which also enters into the aid formula.
Methodologies. The methodologies for fiscal impact studies are fairly clearly defined, the result of
three decades of development of techniques to assess a variety of situations. For the issue of conversion of prime lands, BurchellÕs 1994 Handbook offers a useful summary of the three basic methods.
One method is simple per capita projections, which works well for small individual projects but fails
to capture the differential costs of different kinds or levels of development. A second method is case
studies, which provide a rich literature on which to draw in terms of measured costs and benefits. A
third method is econometric studies, in which models are developed to project costs and revenues
from a single scenario or alternative scenarios over a period of twenty years or more.1
Interested parties. Much of what has been written about the fiscal impact of conversion of prime
lands comes from two groups of interested parties. One group consists of the American Farmland
Trust, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and other organizations that represent the interests
and concerns of farmers, environmentalists, and their allies. Their primary goal is to create and/or
defend a tax and regulatory environment more favorable to preservation of prime agricultural lands
and environmentally sensitive areas, such as wetlands and prime wildlife habitats. The second group
includes some public finance economists and land use planners, mostly connected with local governments or state agencies, who are concerned about service costs and the resources with which to pay
for new service demands. The literature of land use planning is heavily focused on the cost of
providing public services, especially
1

Robert W. Burchell et. al, Development Impact Assessment Handbook The Urban Land Institute, 1994.

local public services, to these new residents. Less attention is paid to the revenue consequences of
development. In part, this imbalance may reflect that fact that revenue effects are more state-specific, being tied to the particular revenue structure of a state and its political subdivision. However,
the problems of using the property tax as a primary local revenue source is an essential part of the
challenge of managed growth that slows the conversion of prime lands to developed uses while also
protecting the fiscal health of local governments.
Case studies and empirical findings
The literature from both of these sources speaks with a consistent voice. Unplanned, unregulated
development is costly to local and to state governments, almost always increasing costs of service
provision more than the revenue that results from the development. The evidence that development
of most kinds has a negative fiscal impact on local governments ranges from anecdotal to highly
sophisticated econometric studies. Different scholars find different cost and revenue figures for
different kinds of development, but the message is consistently clear. If one clearly and carefully
assesses the full costs of servicing new developments, particularly residential developments, then
city and county governments are better off with farm land than they are with housing developments.
And while industrial and commercial developments, taken in isolation, often more than pay their
own way in terms of local service costs and demands, the full impact of the industrial and/or commercial development and the associated housing developments that follow is almost always negative. Benfield et. al report that
ÒAccording to the American Farmland Trust, farmlands and open space
actually provide a fiscal surplus for municipal governments. Although residential developments generate more total revenues than farmland, forests, and
open space, residential land uses also require more in public services. The net
result is that residential development produces a fiscal loss, while farmland,
forest, and open space produce a fiscal benefit. This is a strong argument for
managing growth and maintaining open spaces, including farmland.Ó1
ÒSpecifically, AFT has analyzed data from at least 40 communities in the
Northeast and Midwest during the last decade, using the information to create
a ratio of annual revenues generated from property taxes to annual expenditures for each land-use type. In a summary of this work, AFT concludes that
residential land uses generally cost more in services than they generate in
property taxes, and that they are subsidized by commercial and residential
developments and by farmland, forests, and open space.Ó2
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Differential fiscal impact by type of development. Certain kinds of development typically have a
more positive fiscal impact than others, and many kinds have a negative fiscal impact. The outcome
depends on both the kind of development that takes place and on the tax/revenue structure. Among
types of development, industry often demands the fewest services and generates the highest revenues, while owner-occupied residences below a certain price level are likely to demand more
services than they produce in additional revenue. Residential developments vary greatly in fiscal
impact depending on density, number of school-age children, and taxable property value per resident. Commercial development in South Carolina (in the absence of special tax incentives) typically
generates less revenue per dollar invested than industrial development and usually demands somewhat more local public services per dollar invested.
Burchell and Listokin offer a hierarchy of fiscal impacts based on experience in New Jersey. Within
that hierarchy, it is generally true that there are different fiscal impacts (costs less revenues) for
different kinds of development (scattered or isolated versus dense or infill).1 Overall, however, the
fiscal hierarchy ranges from research office parks with the most positive impact to mobile homes at
the bottom, with unimproved land somewhere in the middle. Townhouses (3-4 bedrooms), inexpensive single family homes (3-4 bedrooms), garden apartments (3+ bedrooms) and mobile homes all
had negative fiscal impact on school districts, while research office parks, office parks, industrial
development, high rise garden apartments (studio or one-bedroom), age-restricted housing, garden
condominiums (1-2 bedroom), open space, retail facilities, townhouses (2-3 bedrooms), and expensive single family homes (3-4 bedrooms) had a positive fiscal impact in descending order. Significantly, for municipalities, retail facilities, 2-3 bedroom townhouses, and expensive single-family
homes also fell into the negative fiscal impact range of the hierarchy.
Distributional impact. When fiscal impact is negative, who pays? Frank argues that it is not the
developer or the homebuyer in many cases, so that the cost implications are not part of the
consumerÕs purchase calculation. In particular, development fees, impact fees, and tax assessments
fail to consider such factors as distance from central facilities, which increases service costs. The
result is overconsumption of housing in areas and densities that are costly to serve and
underconsumption in areas that could be served at lower cost.2 As Benfield notes, impact fees
rarely reflect the full cost of development or even the full capital cost. User fees also tend to reflect
average rather than marginal costs, so that there are cross-subsidies from central city to suburban
residents and apartment dwellers to lower density residents.3
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Fiscal impact by nature of development
There are three intertwined issues on the cost side of the fiscal equation that affect the fiscal impact
of development. One is the type of developmentÑresidential or commercial, single or multi-family,
etc. The second factor is density. The third factor is locationÑinfill or contiguous versus distant or
leapfrog (the pattern referred to as sprawl). A number of the earlier studies were summarized by
Duncan et. al. in 1989.1 They found that studies that looked at a variety of densities and dwelling
types consistently found that, for the same density and dwelling type, leapfrog development was
more costly than contiguous development and in capital costs and farther out cost more than close in.
Costs for public capital and operations ranged from $9,252 to $23,960 per dwelling unit, with the
lowest costs in compact and contiguous developments.
A second review was done by James Frank in the same year.2 This review summarized nine earlier
studies of the impact of alternative development patterns. One of the earliest studies by Wheaton and
Schussheim (1955) looked at both capital and operation and maintenance costs of development of
single family houses, including the allocated cost of inherited facilities. They found that full capital
costs ranged from $27,224 to $33,024 per dwelling unit, depending on service levels, population
characteristics and lot size. Primary costs for streets, sewers, water and drainage fell primarily on the
developer, but there was significant variation in the public costs. Because they assumed septic tanks
rather than sewers, they found less variation related to lot size, but in general they found, as did
others later, that increasing density in a particular development reduced service costs per household.
A second study from the 1950s by Isard and Coughlin, also summarized by Frank, developed cost
simulations for varying densities. They found that medium density (4 units/acre) was the most costly
because it required both sanitary and storm sewers (unlike lower density) and was also the most
expensive in terms of roads (unlike high density). Adjusted to 1987 prices, the total outlay per
dwelling unit for public costs ranged from $17,467 to $24,041.
Still another of the early studies, by Stone, looked at alternative neighborhood sizes and configurations and found sharply different building costs (higher) and development cost (lower) with increasing density. Road costs were particularly significant contributors to this outcome. Frank also
reported on the Real Estate Research Corporation study of the cost of sprawl from the same period.
This study also examined the effects of alternative densities (3-30 units per acre), finding capital
costs per dwelling unit (both public and private) ranging from $76,629 to $112,023 adjusted to 1987
prices. Net of the cost of the dwelling unit itself, the costs ranged from $27,368 to $38,331 per
dwelling unit. Of that cost, the amount paid by the owner or developer ranged from $6,854 to
$13,890 was cost paid by owner or developer for such items as streets, sewer, water, and drainage.
The cost of schools, and open space/recreation ranged from $8,513 to $12,855 per dwelling unit,
while broader public costs such as public facilities, roads, and the public part of sewer, water, and
drainage expense ranged from $6,512 to $8,865 per dwelling unit.
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Yet another study in the Frank review was a Rand (1975) study of municipal pricing. Concentrating
on fire protection, streets, sanitary sewer, and flood control, this study projected costs for a 15 year
period for three alternative scenarios, compact, scatter and leapfrog. In 1987 prices, the cost per
dwelling unit for those four services was $2,078 for compact development, $9,885 for leapfrog, and
$11,581 for scattered development. Likewise, a 1977 study by Downing and Gustely, looking at
costs for police, fire, sanitation, schools, water supply, storm drainage, and sanitary sewers, found
that the cost per unit rose with distance. In summarizing all these studies, Frank noted that the major
items and the ones most sensitive to building patterns are streets, sewers, water systems, storm
drainage and schools.
ÒWhen all capital costs are totaled (neighborhood plus community) for
streets, sewers, water, storm drainage, and schools, the total cost for lowdensity (three dwelling units per acre), sprawl (noncontiguous growth) is
slightly more than $35,000 per dwelling unit (for central sewerage and
water, full curb and gutter, and urban drainage). Further, if that development is located 10 miles from the sewage treatment plant, the central
water source, the receiving body of water, and the major concentration of
employment, almost $15,000 per dwelling unit is added to the cost, for a
total of $48,000 per dwelling, excluding housing and land costs. In the
most extravagant circumstance, that of estate zoning at one dwelling unit
per four acres with full improvement standards and located 10 miles from
all central services, the total cost surpasses $92,000 per dwelling unit.
Costs of infrastructure can be reduced to about $24,000 (the total cost of
streets, utilities, schools and leapfrog development for 12 dwelling units
per acreÉ) by locating developments close to central facilities and employmentÉ and by including multifamily housing typesÉin equal proportion to single-family conventional and single-family cluster units. Further
reduction to about $23,000Éis possible by planning a mixture of housing
types instead of allowing sprawl, that is, by building in locations contiguous to existing development and avoiding costly facilities to span the
bypassed vacant land. Finally, the cost can be reduced to less than
$18,000Éby choosing a central location, using a mix of housing types in
which single family units and townhouses constitute 30 percent of the total
and apartments 70%, ad by planning contiguous development instead of
leapfrogging.Ó1
Burchell, like others before him, emphasizes the implications of planned versus traditional development on infrastructure, housing and public service costs, as well as the implication of both patterns
for protection of prime lands:
1

Ibid, p. 39.

Òdirecting development to areas of excess service costs and away from
those locations that would have to expand public services and infrastructure. Fiscal impacts thus involve initial capital improvement savings, as
well as longer-run savings in operating costs relative to where development
takes place, both regionally and in a single communityÉplanned development or managed growthÉseeks to contain most new growth around
existing centers and limit development in rural and sensitive environmental
areas. It also seeks to save more prime agricultural and fragile lands,
prevent wetland encroachment, buffer streams and other water bodies, and
protect open water and natural habitats. It further seeks to reduce road
construction and water/sewer infrastructure provision through more contained cluster developmentÉby increasing the share and density of development close in to existing development and decreasing the share and
density of development in the outer, more rural and undeveloped areas of
the county or metropolitan area.Ó1
The three major surveys of the literature of the costs of sprawl versus dense/contiguous development
found cost differences as summarized in the following table.

Duncan
Frank
Burchell et. al.

Planned development capital costs as a percentage
of costs of sprawl-type development2
Roads
Schools
Utilities
Other
Capital
40%
93%
60%
102%
73%
99%
66%
na
76%
97%
92%
na

The Rutgers study examined the impact of alternative growth management strategies on conversion
of acreage and impact on fragile lands from 1990-2010 in New Jersey to accommodate projected
increases of 520,000 persons, 431,000 households, and 654,000 employees. The state had about 2
million acres of developable land. Planned development would consume 117,607 acres vs. 292,079
(a difference of 60%), including 30,000 fewer acres of fragile environmental lands (-80%) and
42,000 fewer acres (-40%) of prime agricultural land.3 In addition, the planned development emphasizing contiguity, denseness, infill, and locating close to excess capacity in public capital, would

1

Burchell, Robert W.,1997, Economic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, The Urban Lawyer, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 160-1.

2

Ibid., p. 173-5.

3

Burchell, Robert W. et. al. 1992: Impact Assessment of the New Jersey Interim State Development and Redevelopment Plan, Report
II: Research Findings, Trenton NJ: New Jersey Office of State Planning.

save about 2% a year in cost to cities and school districts ($400 million) just in more efficient service
delivery. There would be a 9% saving in road construction, water and sewer facilities, and school
construction for the same number of housing units.1
Mitigating fiscal impact. Some of the negative fiscal impact of low-density development can be
mitigated by adjusting service and development standards for lot size and density. 2 The presence or
absence of sidewalks, the use of septic tanks rather than sewers, narrower street widths, and other
adjustments depending on lot width seemed to ÒflattenÓ the cost curve over varying densities of
development. Frank, likewise, noted that ÒCost can also be held down by relaxing standards for
roads, sewers, and storm drainage and by allowing narrower roads, septic tanks, and nonpiped
drainage for large lot subdivisionsÉFinally, costs can be reduced Éin the short run by locating
developments where existing capacity is already in place but not yet fully used.Ó3
Policies and their effectiveness
States have created a number of policy tools that can be used at either the state or local level to
accomplish two complementary objectives: slow the conversion of farm, forest and wetlands to
development use, and minimize the negative fiscal impact of development on local governments.
These tools fall into four categories. One is property tax relief for agricultural and related uses. The
second is protective legislation for farmers, including right-to-farm laws and agricultural zoning,
sometimes complemented by restrictions on urban expansion. The third, and most recent, is a series
of quasi-market techniques involving conservation easements and transfer or purchase of development rights on either a permanent basis or for a period of years. The fourth technique is some kind
of full-cost pricing wherein the costs of development that have been borne by all taxpayers are more
correctly assigned to the developments that create the increased costs. Impact fees have a positive
role to play in forcing local governments to develop and disseminate information about the costs of
development as well as ensuring that some share of those costs fall on the developer or his/her
customers. This fourth category will be explored in greater depth in a future report in this series. In
this section, we focus on those tools that are aimed directly at preventing or discouraging conversion
of prime lands by working with the farmer or other non-developer/owner, rather than those tools that
emphasize assigning the costs of development appropriately.
Tax relief. Forty-eight states have differential assessment of agricultural land for property tax purposes, either with a lower tax rate or a lower assessment rate, or in valuing the land by current use
rather than market value. This differential treatment is justified not only in the name of preservation
of greenspace but also by the lower service demands from agricultural lands compared to other uses,
as indicated earlier. In addition to the effect of differential taxation, in states that use conservation
easements or transfer
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or purchase of development rights, the market value of the affected property will decline, reducing
the tax burden on farmers. However, most observers regard tax relief for farmers as a relatively weak
tool, because (as Nelson observes) the tax penalty for conversion is almost always less than the value
of tax deferred or underpaid. Speculators can take advantage of tax relief for farm and forest land to
reduce their holding costs until they are ready to develop.1
Protective legislation. A number of states have passed Òright to farmÓ laws to protect farmers from
various kinds of nuisance lawsuits that limit the use of chemicals and pesticides or challenge smells,
noises, and other aspects of farm operation that are inconvenient to neighbors. These laws offer
some marginal aid to farmers, but will not prevent conversion.
More powerful legislation comes in a variety of zoning regulations that not only protect farmland
and open space but also encourage higher urban density. In Oregon, the use of
Exclusive Farm Use (EFU) zoning was protecting over 16 million acres by 1986, although it still has
not effectively prevented urbanization or conversion to rural residential uses. Oregon also has
established urban growth boundaries (UGB) in which higher density urban growth (1,000 people per
square mile or more) is encouraged. From 1980 to 1994, most of the land urbanized in Oregon was
in UGBs.2
New York, likewise, created agricultural districts starting in 1971. An agricultural district overrides
local land use authorities, requires states to modify regulations in order to facilitate retention of
farmland, offers relief from benefit assessments or ad valorem taxes on farm land for certain improvements, and provides for special agricultural assessment for production land. By 1997, more
than 8 million acres in 408 districts were offered some protection from through agricultural districts.3
Market-based techniques for preserving farms and open space. Increasingly, legislators, farmers,
and environmentalists are turning to market-based methods to preserve farms and open space.
Purchase of development rights, transfer of development rights, and conservation easements, all
closely related techniques, have become popular in the last two decades as a way to slow the conversion of prime land to development uses.
The first major program using market incentives was the Williamson Act in California in 1965. This
act had a dual purpose, to protect agricultural land, preserve open space as an asset to urban development, and ÒÉto discourage dis-contiguous urban development
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patterns and in so doing, decrease the cost of community services.Ó1 Unlike most later programs, this
Act provided for the lease rather than outright purchase of development rights, with rolling 10 year
contracts. If a contract is negated taxes rise gradually over the next nine years until the contract
expires. The Act applies primarily to agricultural land, although some open space is eligible and
some uses compatible with agriculture are allowed (agricultural processing, wine tasting rooms, fish
farms, utility lines, farm worker housing, etc.).
In Maryland, there are conservation easement programs run by four MD counties and the state to
make irrevocable purchases of development rights. The system is incentive- based and voluntary,
with prices reflecting both market appraisals and landowner bids. In some cases, development rights
sold to developers who can transfer them to another area for higher density developments. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can also accept transfer or make purchases of developmental rights
and retire them.2 The goals of this program are to preserve as many acres as possible with limited
funds, with preference given to parcels bordering other preserved lands, operating productive farms,
and/or land under immediate threat of conversion. Maryland actually uses three techniques: purchase of development rights (PDRs) and transfers of development rights (TDRs). One set of PDRs
is operated by counties with rates based on a set formula. This program is more expensive on average than the state program (Maryland Agricultral Land Preservation Foundation, orMALPF), which
uses two market appraisals and the capitalized value of expected future income to set a price on
development rights. MALPF has limited funds and sets priorities based on the ratio of bid to development value. In 1997, TDRs in Montgomery County were selling at $2,200 an acre, while county
PDRs cost $3,652/acre. In all cases the land can continue in its current use but cannot be developed.
An alternative measure is a TDR unit, which is one right for each five acres less one acre for each
dwelling unit on the land (e.g., a nine acre tract with four dwelling units). The price of one such
right averaged $9,000 in Montgomery County in 1997.3
Pennsylvania has chosen to use conservation easements within established agricultural security areas
that meet certain soil class requirements, and contain crop, pasture or grazing land on 50% or more
of the affected acreage. By 1997 977 farms containing 123, 423 acres were in the program with an
average payment of $1946/acre.4
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In the state of Washington, the purchase of development rights program is based on bids by farmers.
During the mid1980s, prices ranged from $480 per acre to $18,975, with a mean of mean $4250.
The sale of development rights affected land values: unresitricted land sold for an average of $1217
more per acre than restricted parcels. A 1996 estimate found that the cost of purchasing the parcels
in the program was $54 million to buy rights plus a $279 million loss per year in assessed valuation,
which must be counted as part of the fiscal impact.1

Summary
The extensive literature on the experience of conversion and protection of prime lands against urban
encroachment, and the impact on the fiscal condition of local governments, speaks with a remarkably consistent voice. The nation is experiencing a rapid pace of urban development, and particularly leapfrog, low-density, high-service cost development that places severe fiscal stress on local
governments while accelerating the lost of prime agricultural and forest lands, wetlands and wildlife
habitats. This process, which results in higher tax burdens and/or deteriorating public capital and
public services, is the result of short-sighted public policy decisions and particularly the inability or
unwillingness to insist that developers pay the full cost of new residential, commercial, and industrial development, differentiated by type and location of the development. Public policy can also
make useful contributions on the side of current owners of farm and forest land and other greenspace
with appropriate incentives to forgo development and retain land in its current use. South Carolina
can draw useful lessons from the experience of many other states in both managing urban growth
and protecting prime lands from unduly rapid conversion while at the same time accommodating
expected population growth and protecting the fiscal health of its cities, counties, and school districts.
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